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| | * Innovation and Intellectual Property | | * Innovation and Intellectual Property |
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| - | * [[DissoiLogoi]] | + | * [[Team:St_Andrews/project/ethics/DissoiLogoi]] |
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| | =Communicaiton= | | =Communicaiton= |
| | Realtime Internet communication is incrasingly common, the so called facebook generation are growing up aquainted with a dizzying array of instantanous comunication methods. The inception of email was hearlded as a revolution in communication, today the quantity of email traffic is at an all time low. In place of email instance messaging and social network messaging have come to precidence. Combined with the vast quanitites of blogs, forum posts, wikis and other forms of user generated content the volume of publically acessible communications is immense. From a human practices perspective this provides a vast and frequently changing dataset which gives insight into how people communicate. | | Realtime Internet communication is incrasingly common, the so called facebook generation are growing up aquainted with a dizzying array of instantanous comunication methods. The inception of email was hearlded as a revolution in communication, today the quantity of email traffic is at an all time low. In place of email instance messaging and social network messaging have come to precidence. Combined with the vast quanitites of blogs, forum posts, wikis and other forms of user generated content the volume of publically acessible communications is immense. From a human practices perspective this provides a vast and frequently changing dataset which gives insight into how people communicate. |
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| - | =Synthetic Biology: A Dissoi Logoi=
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| - | ==Reasoning behind the Dissoi Logoi==
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| - | As the members of a team of scientists actively participating in research in synthetic biology, we are used to recognising the benefits in studying and developing the field. However, there is another side to the argument.
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| - | The practice of “Dissoi Logoi” – literally translating as “different words” is an exercise in rhetoric where the writer or speaker tries to achieve a deeper understanding of a particular issue by arguing the case from the opposite side. Most famously the Wright brothers used this technique during arguments between them; one brother would begin arguing the case for the other brother midway through the argument.
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| - | It is all too easy to see only one side in the argument but through this essay we have tried to look at things from another angle: Synthetic Biology in ‘different words’.
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| - | ==Introduction==
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| - | Since its emergence at the turn of the millennium [1], Synthetic Biology has fast become a controversial topic for debate in both the scientific and wider community. As with any new field there has been much scepticism and opposition to what is a potentially revolutionary field of science. The issues raised are both numerous and entirely reasonable, beyond the usual “Stop playing God” argument which scientist have come to expect from religious groups. Socioeconomic, security and health risks make up the body of those which would be perilous to ignore at a crucial period in future of the science and could, without any degree of fatalism, be the catalysts to a crisis on Earth comparable to a Third World War.
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| - | ==Taking the long way round…==
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| - | It would be short-sighted of any informed member of the public to deny the potential advances in medicine [2] and energy-production [3] which will inevitably become available after further research and many further years of strict testing have been done on the safety and feasibility of such applications. It is certainly a case of when, not if, these technologies will arise. The question raised is however, could the benefits of such technologies be realised in a more immediate, more economical and more sustainable way. And the answer is irrefutably yes. This issue is one of both moral and logical foundation. A new technology takes time to research, it takes money to develop, it takes further time and money to test, and it eventually comes to the market under the ownership of a highly powerful commercial company whose ultimate aim is to make a profit. Consider some of the major technological innovations from the current era: the Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner (MRI); the pacemaker; the heart rate monitor. All clearly revolutionary inventions which have saved lives in the developed world, and inventions into which millions of pounds is spent – the UK spending on research & development in the 2010 fiscal year was £0.9 billion [4] – but which the majority of those in poverty in the Third World will never reap the benefits. Given time there will no doubt be an artificially synthesised bacterium which can be grown in a bottle in a lab in America, sold to an aid organisation for a healthy profit, and flown half-way across the world to Africa to be administered to a patient suffering the effects of cholera. But surely the same end result could be achieved by installing a well in the patient’s village to provide clean water. The typical cost of this is $21 per capita [5]. The idea is to cut out the source of the disease entirely, and in doing so prevent upwards of a hundred thousand deaths globally on a yearly basis [6]. Developed countries researching technologies which are then only used for the benefit of their own healthcare will globally improve nothing. The key point to be made is prioritisation. Should billions of pounds be spent on research in fields such as Synthetic Biology while similar benefits could be achieved with more immediacy and greater economy? And who could say that one of the lives saved could not then play a part in the next breakthrough in modern science?
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| - | ==Open to debate==
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| - | There is a frequent comparison made between the ethos of Synthetic Biology and the Open Source Software community. The premise is that Synthetic Biology is a science that can be performed by anyone who posses sufficient interest and either money (or failing that, ingenuity) to do so. Such a mentality became true in the second half of the 20th century when the personal computer began to become a commercially viable commodity [7], and effectively anyone could start writing their own programs and developing hardware and software.. Certainly there are certain parallels to be drawn with regards to the open source nature of the software, but in terms of the hardware, and the potential for any real scientific discoveries to be made in the garage of an amateur hobbyist, the comparisons are much more strained. The level of understanding required and the scale of equipment needed to perform the necessary experiments will always be beyond the means of the average person. In fact in can be said with some confidence that the majority of “Biohackers” are university-educated. A recent survey of the DIYBio community found around a third of those conducting DIYBio were employed in Biotechnology, with almost all of the participants having a university education [8]. It should therefore be apparent that Synthetic Biology will never develop into the democratised structure seen in modern Computing. Rather it will continue to be performed by a relatively small community with sufficient expertise and interest. One of the respondents, when asked about the link between DIYBio and Synthetic Biology quoted “I'm sick of hearing about synthetic biology since this is not an area DIYers are likely to make a lot of progress progress in (not should they be allowed to in most cases)”.
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| - | ==A Monopoly over life?==
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| - | In May 2010, a paper published entitled “Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome” changed the future of science. The authors designed and synthesised an artificial genome which was then placed in a bacterial cell which was subsequently controlled only by the implanted chromosome. Whether or not the paper describes the creation of “artificial life” or not is a moot point. The grounding is there and one man is on the brink of having absolute control over its future direction. J. Craig Venter is the leading figure in Synthetic Biology. It was at the J. Craig Venter Institute that the first artificial genome was created, and it is J. Craig Venter who intends to patent his “invention” and pave the way for future applications in the biochemical industry. Venter’s company Synthetic Genomics established in 2009 a $600 million collaboration with ExxonMobil in a venture whose ultimate outcome is the development of an algae biofuels for commercial use [9]. Were Venter to be successful in gaining his patents, the techniques and practices required to actively develop Synthetic Biology would be closed to all but those under the operation of Venter and his mass academic and commercial umbrella. While it is undeniable that Venter has clear scientific motives for all his work, he is also all too aware of the huge commercial value that his field holds. ExxonMobil generated profits of $19 billion in what was an economically unstable 2009, of which $196 million was committed to charitable causes [10], [11]. Surely then one of the main spinoffs of Venter’s work will be to further increase the profitability of a company whose primary motivation is to generate money for its own benefit. Any potential medical advance would presumably follow the same pattern and so the world-changing drugs and treatments promised would become commercially controlled and inaccessible to those who really need them. In the race to decode the human genome, Venter’s company Celera filed 6,500 patents for whole or partial human genes [12]. At that time the patents were not granted, much to the relief if the scientific community.
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| - | However, in 2010 it was revealed that “around a quarter of the genes in the human genome” now have patents associated with them owned by a variety of companies [12]. The possible implications of this are alarming. Surely allowing Venter to continue on his current path would be similarly dangerous for the future of not only science but of the human race.
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| - | ==An issue of safety ==
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| - | A raft of safety concerns exist surrounding Synthetic Biology. The potential for malicious use in the creation of a new generation of purpose-built biological weapons is among the most prominent. This is a very real concern. In 2002 a team of researchers mail-ordered sequences of synthetic DNA and were then able to create a working version of the deadly poliovirus [13]. Since then the team say they have gone through the process six more times, with each attempt proving successful faster and more easily as technology, driven by Synthetic Biology develops and becomes more efficient [14]. Had the “experiment” been performed by less respectable scientists the ramifications could have been catastrophic. And this is not a one-off case either. Similar achievement include the recreation of the extinct Spanish Flu in 1997 and a journalist paid for the synthesis of a fragment of DNA of the virus responsible for the smallpox disease which a sufficiently well-read group of scientists could have turned into a world-wide pandemic in just a few weeks [15]. Synthetic Biology is the medium which facilitates this kind of phenomenon. The major upshot of this is that the world superpowers become ever more aware of the threat posed to them by bioterror, and as such spend increasingly vast sums of money protecting themselves from the predicted waves of biological weapons set to be coming there way any day. President Obama recently increased the US biodefence budget to $6.48 billion, spread across a number of governmental departments. These are examples of deliberate misuse of the science, but just as dangerous are the risks of unintentional contamination. There is simply no way to predict the effects of releasing a new bacterium, whether entirely or in part artificially synthesised into the natural environment. Whether the ‘environment’ in question is the human gut or a farmer’s field is of little consequence. Mutations will occur randomly - as nature intended - and the bacteria could develop any manner of resistance, virulence or other variation in genetic structure. The consequences of this are totally unpredictable but would inevitably have a detrimental effect on the environment and very possibly its inhabitants.
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| - | == The end of the road==
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| - | And so we must ask the question “Synthetic Biology, is it worth it?” The answer is most certainly no. Doing a simple cost-benefit analysis, the numbers simply don’t add upp, and t progress with the same high level of funding in this fledgling field could prove to be a huge bioerror. Of course there are clear applications which in time will be realised by Dynthetic Biology but in our present situation there are more pressing matters for which the money lavished on this new arena of science could be effectively put to use. Possibly it is too late however, and J. Craig Venter is at this moment thinking up future experiments and projects to even further push the limits of our knowledge and break through the social, economical and ethical boundaries placed in his way.
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| - | == References ==
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| - | [1] Priscilla E. M. Purnick & Ron Weiss, Synthetic Biology Milestones, Nature Reviews, 2010 http://www.nature.com/nrm/journal/v10/n6/fig_tab/nrm2698_I1.html [Accessed 18 August]
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| - | [2] Benner S.A. et al, “Synthetic biology for improved personalized medicine” Nucleic Acids Symposium Series 52 243-244 (2008)
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| - | [3] “Synthetic Biology & Bioenergy”, J. Craig Venter Institute, 2010, http://www.jcvi.org/cms/research/groups/synthetic-biology-bioenergy/ [Accessed 18 August]
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| - | [4] Chantrill C, “ Public Spending Details for 2010”, UK Public Spending.co.uk, 2010 http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/classic.html#ukgs30210 [Accessed 19 August]
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| - | [5] Smart A, “Clean Water For Africa”, 2008, http://cleanwaterforafrica.blogspot.com/ [Accessed 19 August]
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| - | [6] “Cholera (Fact Sheet no. 107)”, WHO, 2010, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/ [Accessed 19 August]
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| - | [7] “Timeline of Computer History”, Computer History Museum, 2006, http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?category=cmptr [Accessed 20 August]
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| - | [8] “Survey”, DIYbio, 2010, http://diybio.org/survey/ [Accessed 21 August]
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| - | [9] Syntheic Genomics, 2009, http://www.syntheticgenomics.com/media/media.html [Accessed 20 August]
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| - | [10] Clark A, “ExxonMoibl Profits Slump to $19bn”, The Guardian, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/01/exxonmobil-oil-profits-slump [Accessed 19 August]
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| - | [11] ExxonMobil, 2010, http://www.exxonmobil.co.uk/UK-English/community.aspx [Accessed 21 August]
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| - | [12] www.lab-times.org/labtimes/issues/lt2010/lt04/lt_2010_04_20_23.pdf
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| - | [13] “Extreme Genetic Engineering: An Introduction to Synthetic Biology”, ETC Group, 2007, http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/602/01/synbioreportweb.pdf [Accessed 20 August]
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| - | [14] Joby Warrick, “Custom-Built Pathogens Raise Bioterror Fears,” Washington Post, July 31, 2006
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| - | [15] James Randerson, “Lax laws, virus DNA and potential for terror,” The Guardian, 14 June 2006
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