Team:TU Munich/EthicsAndBiosafety
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Synthetic biology is expected to provide huge benefits to society, going from detecting and curing diseases, fabrication of biodegradable plastics to the promise to produce CO<sub>2</sub> neutral fuel. But next to expectations, synthetic biology raises ethical questions such as concerns about biosecurity or to what extend man is legitimatized to manipulate nature. Some of those aspects will be discussed in the following. However, it has to be noted that by now many applications of synthetic biology and therefore its ethical implications are more or less just plans and intellectual games so far. | Synthetic biology is expected to provide huge benefits to society, going from detecting and curing diseases, fabrication of biodegradable plastics to the promise to produce CO<sub>2</sub> neutral fuel. But next to expectations, synthetic biology raises ethical questions such as concerns about biosecurity or to what extend man is legitimatized to manipulate nature. Some of those aspects will be discussed in the following. However, it has to be noted that by now many applications of synthetic biology and therefore its ethical implications are more or less just plans and intellectual games so far. | ||
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- | One of the biggest issues in contemporary literature is the fear of bioterrorism emerging from synthetic organisms. Since the synthetic biology community is carried by an open source mentality, knowledge and techniques to create harmful organisms are widely accessible. Just recently a reporter from The Guardian could order genomic parts of the smallpox virus. The CIA raises the fear that “engineered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man” | + | One of the biggest issues in contemporary literature is the fear of bioterrorism emerging from synthetic organisms. Since the synthetic biology community is carried by an open source mentality, knowledge and techniques to create harmful organisms are widely accessible. Just recently a reporter from The Guardian could order genomic parts of the smallpox virus. The CIA raises the fear that “engineered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man”<sup>[[Team:TU_Munich/EthicsAndBiosafety#ref1|[1]]]</sup>. But even in the borders of known diseases, a certain caution is needed: for example researchers already managed to reconstruct the deadly Spanish Flu virus from 1918, which is estimated to have killed more people than the first world war, reviving this virus and setting it free would lead to a development described by Craig Venter as “the first Jurassic Park scenario"<sup>[[Team:TU_Munich/EthicsAndBiosafety#ref2|[2]]]</sup>. It is even feared that the widely spread Do-it-yourself mentality in the field might lead to something called “biohacking”: Copying and assembling parts and manipulating organisms for the sake of creating something dangerous just to prove you can do it. |
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Those are dangers which should be neither under- nor overestimated. It took years, a whole lab of very skilled scientists and an awful lot of money for Craig Venter to copy the first organism artificially and it is not likely that bioterrorists will achieve the same even with something as simple as a virus in short time frames. Scientists working on harmful pathogens should be forced to obey high international safety standards to make sure that the risk to themeselves and the surrounding population is minimized. Most likely illnesses from uncharted regions and threats from zoonosis followed by disease invasion are a much higher risk than new assembled pathogens created using synthetic biology. Nevertheless many governments are starting to realize the promises originating from synthetic biology. For most politicians it is obvious that an emerging field with thousands of stakeholders can not be controlled anymore by a gentleman's agreement like it took place between the pioneers of genetic engineering in Asilomar 1975. Instead panels of experts were created to keep track on the field and to give advice to decision makers. In Europe the expert from the European commission releases an report on the field every few years, whereas the newly reconstituted US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues is the central advisory board in the US. Transnational research groups emerged in the field of humanities like SYNBIOSAFE to investigate recent developments of synthetic biology from an ethical standpoint. In addition to that the economy already tries to anticipate governmental regulations by introducing a self control like it happened for gene synthesis companies, in order to prevent unauthorized orders of harmful genes. | Those are dangers which should be neither under- nor overestimated. It took years, a whole lab of very skilled scientists and an awful lot of money for Craig Venter to copy the first organism artificially and it is not likely that bioterrorists will achieve the same even with something as simple as a virus in short time frames. Scientists working on harmful pathogens should be forced to obey high international safety standards to make sure that the risk to themeselves and the surrounding population is minimized. Most likely illnesses from uncharted regions and threats from zoonosis followed by disease invasion are a much higher risk than new assembled pathogens created using synthetic biology. Nevertheless many governments are starting to realize the promises originating from synthetic biology. For most politicians it is obvious that an emerging field with thousands of stakeholders can not be controlled anymore by a gentleman's agreement like it took place between the pioneers of genetic engineering in Asilomar 1975. Instead panels of experts were created to keep track on the field and to give advice to decision makers. In Europe the expert from the European commission releases an report on the field every few years, whereas the newly reconstituted US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues is the central advisory board in the US. Transnational research groups emerged in the field of humanities like SYNBIOSAFE to investigate recent developments of synthetic biology from an ethical standpoint. In addition to that the economy already tries to anticipate governmental regulations by introducing a self control like it happened for gene synthesis companies, in order to prevent unauthorized orders of harmful genes. | ||
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It is hard to discuss those questions in general and it is even harder to offer something close to a general solution. Next to the philosophical question practical issues, like patent rights, evolve. | It is hard to discuss those questions in general and it is even harder to offer something close to a general solution. Next to the philosophical question practical issues, like patent rights, evolve. | ||
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- | As the ethical framework to address this question is still underdeveloped, the European Union High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) emphasis the importance of a general debate about synthetic biology in society | + | As the ethical framework to address this question is still underdeveloped, the European Union High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) emphasis the importance of a general debate about synthetic biology in society<sup>[[Team:TU_Munich/EthicsAndBiosafety#ref3|[3]]]</sup>. Then the society can deliberate whether synthetic biology as a field should be supported by the public funding and which ethical limits should be set. In order to allow such a reasonable debate it is most important that the public knows about the uses and risks in synthetic biology and it is our job as scientists to provide these information. |
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Synthetic biology also raises new issues in philosophical disciplines such as ontology: the philosophical studies of the categories of being. It is essential to know how to categorize products of synthetic biology in order to decide on how to act appropriate. Is a synthetically created organism still life or is it more a man made machine? And what are the consequences of either case? This questions aims directly to the heart of our project since the central point of our iGEM contribution is to evolve a network which can at least partly turn a cell into something which can be controlled like a computer. | Synthetic biology also raises new issues in philosophical disciplines such as ontology: the philosophical studies of the categories of being. It is essential to know how to categorize products of synthetic biology in order to decide on how to act appropriate. Is a synthetically created organism still life or is it more a man made machine? And what are the consequences of either case? This questions aims directly to the heart of our project since the central point of our iGEM contribution is to evolve a network which can at least partly turn a cell into something which can be controlled like a computer. | ||
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Another major problem corresponding with evolution is not only how is the environment going to modify my artificial network but also how may the network influence the environment. <br> | Another major problem corresponding with evolution is not only how is the environment going to modify my artificial network but also how may the network influence the environment. <br> | ||
- | Will it ever reach the point at which it is more effective than the actual basic cell components? Are cells with an artificial network in any way better equipped for evolutionary challenges than other cells, so is there a threat to biodiversity if set free? The cells might use their ability to optimize their circuits in order to compete against other organisms. A problem which would never apply for electronics, or have you ever seen a “wild computer”? In a review article for the British Research Council it is already noted that “mutations in the genome of synthetic organism could produce unexpected interactions with the environment and other living, natural organisms” | + | Will it ever reach the point at which it is more effective than the actual basic cell components? Are cells with an artificial network in any way better equipped for evolutionary challenges than other cells, so is there a threat to biodiversity if set free? The cells might use their ability to optimize their circuits in order to compete against other organisms. A problem which would never apply for electronics, or have you ever seen a “wild computer”? In a review article for the British Research Council it is already noted that “mutations in the genome of synthetic organism could produce unexpected interactions with the environment and other living, natural organisms”<sup>[[Team:TU_Munich/EthicsAndBiosafety#ref2|[2]]]</sup>. |
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This is very unlikely with the way our network is designed. First of all, all components are to be located on a plasmid. Plasmids are only kept by ''E. coli'' as long as they give advantage and allow survival in certain conditions like LB media supplied with antibiotics. Otherwise they are a waste of energy, cells with plasmids in an environment where they are not needed have an replication disadvantage and are likely to lose this plasmid over time. This is enhanced in our case by the potential inputs and outputs which may also be located on the same or different plasmids, if they consist of complex proteins they are likely to be a major disadvantage concerning growth rates and energy efficiency. It is rather likely that bacterial cells are excellent in replicating the way they are and our synthetic network will not help ''E. coli'' to gain an evolutionary advantage. | This is very unlikely with the way our network is designed. First of all, all components are to be located on a plasmid. Plasmids are only kept by ''E. coli'' as long as they give advantage and allow survival in certain conditions like LB media supplied with antibiotics. Otherwise they are a waste of energy, cells with plasmids in an environment where they are not needed have an replication disadvantage and are likely to lose this plasmid over time. This is enhanced in our case by the potential inputs and outputs which may also be located on the same or different plasmids, if they consist of complex proteins they are likely to be a major disadvantage concerning growth rates and energy efficiency. It is rather likely that bacterial cells are excellent in replicating the way they are and our synthetic network will not help ''E. coli'' to gain an evolutionary advantage. | ||
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Although our RNA circuits might introduce a higher abstraction level to the cells, this does not mean that we are trying to make “better” cells compared to those which are not manipulated. With more than 3 billion years of evolution, bacteria are one of the most thoroughly tested organisms. What our approach facilitates compared to unmodified cells, is to improve the control for scientists. However this does not yet make a better organism and is most likely not providing them with an evolutionary advantage. | Although our RNA circuits might introduce a higher abstraction level to the cells, this does not mean that we are trying to make “better” cells compared to those which are not manipulated. With more than 3 billion years of evolution, bacteria are one of the most thoroughly tested organisms. What our approach facilitates compared to unmodified cells, is to improve the control for scientists. However this does not yet make a better organism and is most likely not providing them with an evolutionary advantage. | ||
- | =Safety= | + | =Safety Declaration= |
- | So to sum it up, beside possible ethical controversity which does not only apply for our artificial network but for all work done with genetically modified organisms, all our parts should not represent a danger to individuals or the environment. We only used derivatives of E. coli K12 cells, which contain gene deletions to reduce the competitive capacity of the cells and avoid survival outside the laboratory. We worked under biosafety containment level 1 and all materials being in contact with living cells were autoclaved before disposal. | + | So to sum it up, beside possible ethical controversity which does not only apply for our artificial network but for all work done with genetically modified organisms, all our parts should not represent a danger to individuals or the environment. We only used derivatives of ''E. coli'' K12 cells, which contain gene deletions to reduce the competitive capacity of the cells and avoid survival outside the laboratory. We worked under biosafety containment level 1 and all materials being in contact with living cells were autoclaved before disposal. |
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=References= | =References= | ||
+ | <html><a name="ref1"></a></html>[1] Central Intelligence Agency (2003) The Darker Bioweapons Future prepared by Office of Transnational Issues available here: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf | ||
+ | <html><a name="ref2"></a></html>[2] Balmer A., Martin P., 2008, Synthetic Biology: Social and Ethical Challenges, Institute for Science and Society, University of Nottingham. http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/organisation/policies/reviews/scientific-areas/0806-synthetic-biology.aspx | ||
+ | <html><a name="ref3"></a></html>[3] EU Commission. (2005): Synthetic Biology - Applying Engineering to Biology ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/syntheticbiology_b5_eur21796_en.pdf | ||
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*Hayden 2009; Keeping genes out of terrorists’ hands; Nature Vol 461|3 September 2009; http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/WMD%20Terrorism/Nature_Readings.pdf<br> | *Hayden 2009; Keeping genes out of terrorists’ hands; Nature Vol 461|3 September 2009; http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/WMD%20Terrorism/Nature_Readings.pdf<br> | ||
*EU Commission 2009; Ethics of synthetic biology; European group on ethics in science and new technologies to the european commission; http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion25_en.pdf<br> | *EU Commission 2009; Ethics of synthetic biology; European group on ethics in science and new technologies to the european commission; http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion25_en.pdf<br> | ||
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*Central Intelligence Agency (2003) The Darker Bioweapons Future prepared by Office of Transnational Issues available here: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf | *Central Intelligence Agency (2003) The Darker Bioweapons Future prepared by Office of Transnational Issues available here: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf | ||
*http://www.synbiosafe.eu/<br> | *http://www.synbiosafe.eu/<br> | ||
- | *http://www.bioethics.gov/<br> | + | *http://www.bioethics.gov/<br> --> |
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Latest revision as of 12:46, 26 October 2010
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Biosafety and EthicsGeneral Issues in Synthetic BiologySynthetic biology is a new chapter in biological sciences which comprises advances in different fields such as molecular biology, engineering, computer sciences and organic chemistry to create new biological systems which do not exist in nature. Therefore it can be seen as the final transformation of biology from a describing science to a designing technology.
Synthetic biology is expected to provide huge benefits to society, going from detecting and curing diseases, fabrication of biodegradable plastics to the promise to produce CO2 neutral fuel. But next to expectations, synthetic biology raises ethical questions such as concerns about biosecurity or to what extend man is legitimatized to manipulate nature. Some of those aspects will be discussed in the following. However, it has to be noted that by now many applications of synthetic biology and therefore its ethical implications are more or less just plans and intellectual games so far.
Biosafety and Ethics concerning engineered networks in living organismsIn our iGEM project we attempt to create logic gates based on RNA molecules and eventually implement these in living cells. As we applied principles known from computer science to biological molecules, the idea of logic gates itself is obviously not very new and our RNA circuits will not reach the complexity of electronic devices due to difficulties in handling biomolecules.
Therefore our network of RNA switches has one big problem compared to an electronic device: It cannot be manufactured as precisely as it is possible to make a waver using lithographic techniques, simply because the parts are not fixed in space. Although the characteristics of RNA make it easier to construct logic gates compared to biomolecular switches used so far, it is still way more complicated than using a lithographic template to precisely etch every transistor where it should be.
Possible influences of the cellular environment on engineered circuits in organismsThe other potential advantage of utilizing logic circuits in biological surrounding is the main force behind progress: Evolution. As computers are not a subject of replication, mutation and selection, this principle is not really contrivable with electronic circuits, so it is an interesting question what will happen to our RNA-based devices. It would be a big advantage of biological circuits if they could be optimized by directed evolution approaches. Thus it might be possible to let nature design our logic circuits by mutation and selection, and relieve the “wiring diagram” from limitation of human creativity. One could imagine that once the basic logic gates are established in cells, you just have to select for solving a certain problem in a typical directed evolution approach: either solve it, or perish! Those cells have then optimized their circuits by means of replication and evolution, a thing impossible for a classical computer.
Safety DeclarationSo to sum it up, beside possible ethical controversity which does not only apply for our artificial network but for all work done with genetically modified organisms, all our parts should not represent a danger to individuals or the environment. We only used derivatives of E. coli K12 cells, which contain gene deletions to reduce the competitive capacity of the cells and avoid survival outside the laboratory. We worked under biosafety containment level 1 and all materials being in contact with living cells were autoclaved before disposal. References[1] Central Intelligence Agency (2003) The Darker Bioweapons Future prepared by Office of Transnational Issues available here: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf [2] Balmer A., Martin P., 2008, Synthetic Biology: Social and Ethical Challenges, Institute for Science and Society, University of Nottingham. http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/organisation/policies/reviews/scientific-areas/0806-synthetic-biology.aspx [3] EU Commission. (2005): Synthetic Biology - Applying Engineering to Biology ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/syntheticbiology_b5_eur21796_en.pdf
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