Team:British Columbia/Safety


Revision as of 05:17, 1 October 2010 by Ayjchan (Talk | contribs)

2. Do any of the new BioBrick parts or devices that you made this year raise any safety issues?

Our new BioBrick part, DspB is a biofilm matrix-degrading enzyme and does not raise any significant safety issues. It has been sequenced and assayed for its enzymatic activity and found to be reliable. In the circumstance that a safety incident occurs, users will be able to contact us and we will update the Registry with their report.

3. Is there a local biosafety group, committee, or review board at your institution?

The local biosafety group for our project is the Department of Health Safety and Environment (HSE) of UBC. Our laboratory space and equipment meets all safety requirements as per Canadian regulations and the regulations of the HSE. All members of our team have also taken the required Laboratory health safety course from our local biosafety group. Presently, our team has not embarked on research using pathogenic bacterial strains or phages. Our research also does not involve the transference of toxins or drug resistance that could compromise the use of the drug to control disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture.

4. Do you have any other ideas how to deal with safety issues that could be useful for future iGEM competitions?

4.1. Biosafety engineering and design of a safer chassis
Current safety engineering tools such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) have yet to be extensively incorporated into synthetic biology models. One large obstacle is the fact that organisms are complex and not everything is known about their inner processes and community interactions. So while synthetic biologists are able to make logical predictions regarding their designed part or system, the sphere of knowledge of the chassis is greatly limited. This reason also motivates the current search for a safer chassis-one that is understood inside and out. This level of mastery and knowledge of what is being engineered distinguishes synthetic biology from synthetic machinery. In order to engineer safety into our synthetic biology parts or systems, it is necessary to attain a good understanding of what it does in its natural setting, design safety elements based on this knowledge and its extrapolation, and then collect experimental data on its behavior and mutability in synthetic settings. Just as conventional safety engineering utilizes real engineering data and designs, biosafety engineering has to become a whole and unique field unto itself. Research in controlled system-destruction is growing, and there will probably be research in the mutability of different types of synthetic biological circuits. One field of research that is instrumental to biosafety engineering is that of the intelligent synthesis of whole genomes from scratch. This will no doubt provide valuable insights as to the workings of the organism in study and also lead to the production of synthetic chassis and systems that are much more manipulable, controllable and predictable.

4.2. Public perception of risks and safety issues
Through our human practices project, we are exploring different perspectives of synthetic biology by asking members of the public, as well as iGEM participants, to create art in the form of visual arts or stories conveying their perception of synthetic biology and its potential impact on the world. We hope that by stimulating the public to learn more about synthetic biology and hopefully engaging in a meaningful exchange of ideas, the public will gain a deeper and sounder understanding of what synthetic biology is and how synthetic biologists also seek to install the necessary safety infrastructure. By asking for public opinion, synthetic biologists also have the opportunity to address public concerns and lay a firmer foundation for future synthetic biology ventures and applications in the real world. Since the benefits and consequences of synthetic biology research are shared by both researchers and the public, the two must actively seek to listen, inform and negotiate. Scientific risk assessment may produce quantitative measures of potential damage, but this is only a model of what may happen in reality. In order to validate the assumptions, applicability and foresight of these risk assessment estimates, we need to receive the input of the public, who are representative of real-life data. As the term “human practices” suggests, synthetic biologists who endeavour to develop the human practices aspect of their research must consider the same things that society considers. Will the fruits of our research be accessible to the poor? Are people in charge trustworthy? Will there be potential consequences for future generations? Are there ways for us to control the applications of our research? In other words, our synthetic biology parts and systems are like children born into the world. Scientific risk assessment is careful planning. Engaging with society is the actual raising of synthetic biology children. There has to be an increase in public awareness of what synthetic biology is and what it can do. There also has to be an increase in dialogue (whether through public forums or through art and entertainment) not just within the scientific community but also with the public.